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NOTES
THIRD PARTY LIABILITY OF THE PRIVATE SPACE INDUSTRY: To
PAY WHAT No ONE HAS PAID BEFORE
Private launchers of spacecraft currently face a perplexing
array of possible domestic and international tort liability. The
risk of such liability could discourage some private launchers
from further developing outer space, thereby undermining the
United States' goal of achieving aerospace preeminence. The
author proposes both streamlining domestic and international
tort law in this area and placing financial caps on damage
awards to third parties injured by private spacecraft.
INTRODUCTION
PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN the United States is now in the
business of launching spacecraft. Two recent events mark the
fruition of the Reagan administration's policy to open develop-
ment and exploration of outer space to private organizations. 1
First, on March 29, 1989, Space Services, Inc. ("Space Services")
launched Starfire One, the first commercially licensed spacecraft
launch in the United States.2 Starfire One carried an experimen-
I. The policy seeks to encourage private development of outer space by "'bring[ing]
into play America's greatest asset - the vitality of our free enterprise system.'" Com-
ment, Legal Aspects of the Commercialization of Space Transportation Systems, 3 HIGH
TECH. Li. 99, 102 n.19 (1989) (quoting President's Radio Address to the Nation, 20
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 113-14 (Jan. 28, 1984)).
2. Boehler, Paper Trails to Contrails: Starfire I Boosts Free Enterprise and Subor-
bital Payloads, AD ASTRA, June 1989, at 39, 39.
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tal, privately owned payload on a suborbital flight around the
earth.3 Space Services also anticipates launches of orbital satel-
lites boosted by its more powerful Conestoga One rocket.4
The second milestone achieved by the private space industry
was the August 1989 launch of a communications satellite by Mc-
Donnell Douglas Space Systems Company ("McDonnell Doug-
las"). This launch was the "first launch ever of a satellite into
earth orbit by a private corporation." Unlike the Space Services
operation, the McDonnell Douglas satellite was launched from a
government owned facility with the assistance of government con-
tractors.7 The two missions present a complete picture of possible
private sector launches: suborbital or orbital payloads using pri-
vate or public facilities.
Legal considerations necessarily accompany private enter-
prise into outer space. The private development of outer space cre-
ates exposure to potentially astronomical liability to third parties'
injured by malfunctioning spacecraft or rocket boosters. Illustra-
tive of the magnitude of risk faced by the space industry is the
October 18, 1989 launch of the Galileo interplanetary explorer.'
The Galileo is a nuclear fueled satellite that was carried into
outer space aboard the space shuttle Atlantis.0 Although Galileo
itself will be in earth's orbit only for a short period of time,"' the
3. Specifically, Starfire One carried a 650 pound payload consisting of "six experi-
ments primarily designed to explore how various materials react when manufactured in the
vacuum of space." Id.
4. Space Services' project manager believes that the programs employing the Con-
estoga rocket are "where we're going to make our big bucks" because of a significantly
greater payload capacity. Id. at 41.
5. Americas Private Road to Heaven, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 11, 1989,
at 11, 11-12.
6. Id. at 11.
7. Id. (McDonnell Douglas utilized Cape Canaveral's facilities and services).
8. For the purposes of this note, "third party" will be defined as in the Commercial
Space Launch Act Amendments, which define "third party" as any person or entity not
actively involved in the launch of the spacecraft. The Commercial Space Launch Act
Amendments of 1988, 49 U.S.C. § 2603(l1)(A)-(D) (1988); see infra text accompanying
notes 47-57.
9. See generally Covault, Shuttle Launch of Galileo Jupiter Mission Highlights
U.S. Space Science Renaissance, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Oct. 23, 1989, at 22
(describing details of the Galileo launch).
10. See generally Foley, NASA Prepares for Protests Over Nuclear System Launch
on Shuttle in October, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH.. June 26, 1989, at 83 (analyzing
public fears of nuclear power sources in outer space.)
11. Galileo was carried in space shuttle Atlantis's cargo bay and deployed into outer
space after the shuttle attained its holding orbit. Once deployed, the probe left earth's orbit
on its trek to Jupiter. However, once outside earth's orbit, Galileo will perform a "gravity
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danger of liability still exists: a launch accident or unplanned re-
entry of the craft could result in significant radioactive contamina-
tion of the earth's atmosphere or surface.12
The Galileo project was exclusively a governmental endeavor;
consequently private industry risked no liability with respect to
that particular launch. Nevertheless, the Challenger accident
demonstrates that private industry will encounter ever increasing
dangers as it advances in the development and exploration of
outer space. Nuclear powered spacecraft are good examples of
such danger because progress in space necessarily involves using
compact, reliable power sources such as nuclear energy 13 But
even without the possibility of radioactive contamination, a pri-
vately owned space object of significant size represents an unusual
and potentially significant hazard to third parties throughout the
world.' 4
The risk of liability accompanying commercial advances in
outer space should not be allowed to impede the space launch in-
dustry's progress.15  Excessive liability could deter the en-
assist fly-by maneuver" past Venus, followed by two earth "gravity assist fly-bys" in De-
cember 1990 and December 1992. These maneuvers will provide sufficient velocity for the
space vehicle to reach Jupiter in December 1995. According to the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration ("NASA"), the threat of reentry during one of these fly-bys is
one in ten million. Id. at 87.
12. Past launch accidents are illustrative of this danger. For instance, the space shut-
tle Challenger exploded only 74 seconds after lift-off on Jan. 28, 1986. Broad, The Shuttle
Explodes: 6 in Crew and High School Teacher Are Killed 74 Seconds After Liftoff, N.Y
Times, Jan. 29, 1986, at Al, col. 1. If it were carrying a nuclear power source, as the
Galileo space probe did, it might have caused dispersion of radioactive debris along the
east coast of Florida. However, the force of such an explosion would have to be great
enough to rupture the fuel's protective capsule, which NASA claims is unlikely. See Foley,
supra note 10, at 85-87 (discussing field testing of Galileo's nuclear fuel container).
13. See Straubel, Space Borne Nuclear Power Sources - The Status of Their Reg-
ulation, 20 VAL U.L. REv. 187, 188 (1986) (characterizing nuclear power as "reliable,"
"relatively light," long-lasting, and capable of producing great quantities of heat and
energy).
14. The United States has the ability to place extremely large spacecraft into orbit.
For instance, Titan 402 can carry a payload weight of up to 25 tons. Kolcum, Titan 4
Matures: Air Force, Contractors Predict Long Life for Heavy-Lift Vehicle, AvIATION
WEEK & SPACE TECH.. July 17, 1989, at 34. Orbiting research platforms are even larger
than most satellites. For instance, NASA's Skylab, which crashed into Australia on July
12, 1979, weighed 77.5 tons. See Skylab s Spectacular Death, TIME, July 23, 1979, at 35,
35.
15. Congressional findings regarding the importance of the United States commer-
cial launch industry emphasize the goals of assuring "access to space for Government and
commercial users," and continuing the United States' "aerospace preeminence." The Com-
mercial Space Launch Act Amendments of 1988, 49 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2623 (1988) [herein-
after Launch Amendments]. The "overriding need to develop space resources as quickly as
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trepreneurial creativity necessary to further the development of
outer space. Moreover, the federal government's policies of foster-
ing the emergence of a private space launch industry and discour-
aging reliance on the space shuttle would be frustrated.16 Main-
taining a liability structure that will not subject entrepreneurs to
excessive damages is therefore essential to encourage future com-
mercial space launches.
Private organizations striving to develop outer space 7 will
face potential tort liability in both the domestic and international
realms. Relevant United States domestic law currently consists of
federal regulations and common law tort theory, while liability
under international law is established primarily through several
treaties.1 In addition, organizations may be subject to the various
tort laws of any foreign nation in which their malfunctioning
space vehicles cause damage. Companies also may be liable where
such vehicles harm the citizens or nationals of foreign countries."'
The various United States domestic tort theories which could ap-
ply include strict liability for an abnormally dangerous activity,
negligence, and res ipsa loquitur2 0 Therefore, a corporation must
scrutinize both domestic law and international treaties to deter-
mine the full scope of its liability for outer space ventures.
This note begins with an analysis of the current legal frame-
work applicable to commercial enterprises seeking advancement in
outer space. First, it describes the extent of United States domes-
tic liability as provided by recent federal legislation." This discus-
possible" is similar to the need that existed during the "development of the railroads during
the nineteenth century, [and] the United States shipping industry before the Civil War
" G. REYNOLDS & R. MERGES, OUTER SPACE: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 268
(1989).
16. See HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, COMMERCIAL SPACE
LAUNCH AMENDMENTS OF 1988, H.R. REP. No. 639, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1988).
17. McDonnell Douglas, General Dynamics, and Martin Marietta have joined this
pursuit. Egan, For Sale: Commercial Space, AD ASTRA, Dec. 1989, at 9, 11.
18. Note, The Case For a Federal Common Law of Space, N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 509,
511 (1988).
19. Under the lex loci delicti principle, a court will apply the law of the place of the
forum. See Paoletto v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 464 F.2d 976, 979 n.7 (3d Cir. 1972);
Raymark Indus., Inc. v. Stemple, 714 F Supp. 460, 465 (D. Kan. 1988); REsTAfEMENT OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934). This note does not discuss liability under the current
domestic laws of foreign countries because of the prohibitive number and variety of such
laws.
20. See generally Bosco, Manufacturer Liability to Third Parties for Outer Space
Activities, 7 NORTHROP U.L.J. 1, 30-51 (1986) (discussing, at length, the various substan-
tive bases for recovery).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 24-83.
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glehold" on commercial satellite launches because its experience
and prices could not be matched. 38 Internationally, American pri-
vate enterprise had to compete with foreign launch agencies, the
most significant of which was Arianespace. This French company
launched nearly fifty percent of the world's commercial satellites
in 1985.31 Other countries were beginning to develop and market
their own launch services as well, 0 resulting in more competition
from governmentally subsidized organizations.
After the Challenger accident,41 the United States recognized
the value of increasing its support for the private space industry
In the wake of this accident, the federal government decided to
adopt new policies for government launches. First, NASA was re-
stricted to launching government payloads.42 This action forced all
of NASA's commercial customers to find alternative means of ob-
taining access to outer space.43 Second, the government decided to
use expendable launch vehicles ("ELVs") 44 as an alternative
means of boosting satellites, rather than relying exclusively on the
space shuttle. 45 This action eliminated the surplus launch equip-
reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 5525, 5526.
38. Straubel, supra note 26, at 942 (citing The Center of Space Policy, Inc., Com-
mercial Space Industry In the Year 2000: A Market Forecast (June 1985) (unpublished
manuscript unavailable to the public)).
39. H.R. REP. No. 639, supra note 16, at 5. It should also be noted that "[tihe
French Government and the European Space Agency indemnify Arianespace for third
party losses [sic] in excess of $70 million," thus making competition in the world market
even more difficult. Gorove, The Commercial Space Launch Act Amendments of 1988. A
Brief Overview, 16 J. SPACE L. 184, 185 (1988).
40. The Soviet Union is marketing its Proton, China is developing the Long March
system, and Japan is developing the H-2. See Liability Hearings, supra note 27, at 2.
41. See supra note 12.
42. On August 15, 1986, President Reagan announced, "NASA will no longer be in
the business of launching private satellites Instead, NASA and the four shuttles
should be dedicated to payloads important to national security and foreign policy, and even
more, on exploration, pioneering and developing new technologies and uses of space." Fo-
ley, Reagan Bars Shuttle from Competing for New Satellite Launch Contracts, AVIATION
WEEK & SPACE TECH., Aug. 25, 1986, at 22, 22.
43. At the time of this order, forty-four companies held launch service or letter
agreements for space shuttle satellite launches. "The damages to these companies have in
most cases exceeded $100 million on an individual basis, as a result of such expenses as
non-usable Shuttle-unique hardware, software, equipment and documentation " H.R.
REP. No. 639, supra note 16, at 7.
44. Expendable launch vehicles are rocket boosters that, unlike the space shuttle, can
be used only once. The ELVs used extensively by the United States are the Delta, Atlas,
and Titan boosters. These boosters come in a variety of models and "strap-on" solid-fuel
booster configurations. See generally K. GATLAND, THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
SPACE TECHNOLOGY 57 (1981) (describing rockets used by different countries).
45. See Liability Hearings, supra note 27, at 9 (statement of Thomas S. Moorman,
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ment which the Launch Act had originally made available to pri-
vate industry 46 Essentially, foreign competition, combined with
the federal monopoly on launch facilities, threatened to frustrate
the new policy of advancing commercial enterprise in outer space.
B. The 1988 Amendments to the Commercial Space Launch
Act
In response to the needs of the private space industry, Con-
gress passed the Commercial Space Launch Act Amendments of
1988.," This legislation was designed to "encourage, facilitate and
promote the use of the United States commercial space launch
industry in order to continue United States aerospace preemi-
nence." 48 The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation presented the following summary of the Launch
Amendments:
The purposes of the [legislation] are: to amend the Commercial
Space Launch Act; to provide interim transitional support; to
ensure the successful development of a competitive domestic ex-
pendable launch vehicle (ELV) industry; to apportion launch li-
ability risks between the domestic commercial space launch in-
dustry and the U.S. Government; to provide incentives for
certain satellites that were removed by a Presidential directive
from the space shuttle manifest to launch on domestic ELV's; to
establish protections against Government pre-emption of com-
mercial launches on Government ranges; and to recommend the
formulation of international "rules of the road" as regards the
conduct and pricing of commercial space launch activities.49
The Launch Amendments include several provisions that af-
fect a licensee's liability to third parties. First, section 2603(11) of
the Launch Amendments provides a limiting definition of "third
party"
(11) 'third party' means any person or entity other than -
(A) the United States, its agencies, or its contractors or
subcontractors involved in launch services;
(B) the licensee or transferee;
(C) the licensee's or transferee's contractors, subcontrac-
Director of Space and SDI Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force -
Acquisition) (discussing the decision to "revitalize" the ELV programs).
46. Id.
47. Pub. L. 100-657, 102 Stat. 3900 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 2601-2623 (1988)).
48. Launch Amendments, supra note 16, at 3900.
49. S. REP. No. 593, supra note 37, at 1.
510 [Vol. 41:503
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tors, or customers involved in launch services; or
(D) any such customer's contractors or subcontractors in-
volved in launch services 50
This definition explicitly excludes government employees and
contractors as third parties. It also excludes any private employees
and contractors who are involved directly with the actual launch
of a vehicle. These exclusions are important, because severe injury
and property damage are most likely to occur on or near the
launch facility during the actual launch.51 The Launch Amend-
ments' provisions limiting liability for third party injuries52 do not
apply to this high-risk group.
Section 2615 of the Launch Amendments outlines the liabil-
ity insurance requirements of a licensee. These include limits on
insurance coverage, reciprocal waivers of claims among the launch
services organizations, indemnity by the federal government for
third party claims exceeding the required amount of insurance
coverage, and various options available to the Secretary of
Transportation.5"
The first requirement ensures that a licensee has adequate fi-
nancial resources. It provides that an organization must either ob-
tain liability insurance up to a determinable minimum amount or
otherwise demonstrate adequate financial responsibility prior to
receiving a license for a particular launch." For each launch, the
Secretary of Transportation is responsible for determining the
minimum amount of insurance or other financial resources a licen-
see must possess. This determination is based on the "maximum
probable loss from claims by a third party for death, bodily
injury, or loss of or damage to property resulting from activities
carried out under the license 5,55 However, for any particular
50. 49 U.S.C. § 2603(11) (1988).
51. Catastrophic failures of space vehicles have generally occurred at or soon after
lift-off. For instance, in April 1986 a Titan 34D exploded only 700 feet above the launch
pad. "[L]arge solid rocket motor segments, payload, and core booster sections impact[ed]
among the major launch pad structures." Liability Hearings, supra note 27, at 13. No
major fragments of the Titan hit the fully manned Launch Service Building, which is
within 500 yards of the launch pad. Id. at 12. Total damage resulting from this accident
was $58.1 million. Id.
52. See infra text accompanying notes 61-63.
53. 49 U.S.C. § 2615 (1988).
54. Id. § 2615(a)(1)(A).
55. Id. Requiring insurance protects potential third party claimants and assists the
federal government. Specifically, the United States "remains strictly liable for any dam-
ages to foreign states or nationals caused by satellite launch operations pursuant to [inter-
1991]
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launch, a licensee is only required to obtain insurance equalling
the lesser of $500 million or "the maximum liability insurance
available on the world market at a reasonable cost.""6 This provi-
sion effectively places a $500 million cap on a licensee's liability
for damages to third parties. In a particular accident, aggregate
damages awarded to third parties in excess of the $500 million
insurance maximum will be paid by the federal government. 7
The Launch Amendments similarly place a $100 million cap
on the liability insurance required of licensees for claims made by
the United States for "loss of or damage to property of the United
States resulting from activities carried out under the license in
connection with any particular launch." 58 This insurance require-
ment protects government personnel and facilities. As previously
noted, catastrophic damage is most likely to occur in the early
stages of a launch.59 The risk to government resources is more
easily determined than the risk to the general public because the
full extent of damage to the isolated launch area is more foresee-
able.60 It is therefore reasonable to distinguish between the poten-
tial claimants.
The liability insurance section of the Launch Amendments
also requires reciprocal waivers of claims between the licensee and
(1) "its contractors, subcontractors, and customers, and the con-
tractors and subcontractors of such customers,""1 and (2) the Sec-
retary of Transportation, representing "the United States, its
agencies involved in launch services, and contractors and subcon-
tractors involved in launch services."16 2 Essentially, the licensee
and any other organization assisting in the actual launch will be
immune from the other's claims. Therefore, by agreement, the li-
censee's insurance will cover losses incurred by any of these orga-
nizations during the launch operation, regardless of fault.
national agreements]." S. REP. No. 593, supra note 37, at 9. The required insurance, there-
fore, provides a means of compensation available to injured foreign third parties. For
further discussion of international responsibilities in this area, see infra text accompanying
notes 84-156.
56. 49 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)(A).
57. Id. § 2615(b)(1). However, the government will pay no more than $1.5 billion.
Id., see infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
58. 49 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)(B) (1988).
59. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
60. The full value of each launch pad is known and, in the event of commercial use
of a government launch facility, will be taken into consideration for insurance purposes.
61. 49 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(I)(C).
62. Id. § 2615(a)(1)(D).
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sion includes the effects of domestic liability on private space
launch companies and insurance companies. Next, it briefly exam-
ines the extent of liability under existing international law 22 Fi-
nally, this note proposes to limit private organizations' exposure to
third party liability by refining domestic regulations and interna-
tional agreements.23 To accomplish this, the federal government
should provide a specific and exclusive cause of action for injured
local and foreign third parties. This note also proposes a cap on
damage awards. These proposed federal actions would help do-
mestic private enterprise succeed in the international space launch
market.
I. DOMESTIC LAW GOVERNING PRIVATE SPACE LAUNCHES
A. The Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984
1
Congress enacted the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984
("Launch Act")24 to stimulate private investment in commercial,
unmanned space vehicles by creating opportunities for organza-
tions to launch commercial and other private satellites.15 The
Launch Act authorizes the United States, under the auspices of
the Office of Commercial Space Transportation ("OCST"),z6 to
"license launches by U.S. citizens from foreign as well as domestic
sites, to review payloads not under the authority of other agencies,
and to license commercial launch sites."'27
The Launch Act has several provisions pertaining to the po-
tential liability faced by the private space industry 28 The Act es-
sentially prohibits the launch of any space vehicle from United
22. See infra text accompanying notes 84-156.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 157-235.
24. Pub. L. No. 98-575, 98 Stat. 3055 (1984).
25. 49 U.S.C. § 2602 (1988).
26. See Straubel, The Commercial Space Launch Act: The Regulation of Private
Space Transportation, 52 J. AIR L. & CoM. 941, 953 (1987) (although the OCST has been
operating informally since 1983, it has since been officially delegated responsibility for ad-
ministering the Launch Act); Comment, supra note 1, at 110 (the commercial launch in-
dustry is "regulated by the Department of Transportation's Office of Commercial
Space Transportation").
27. Commercial Expendable Launch Vehicle Liability: Hearing before the Sub-
comm. on Science, Technology, and Space of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, United States Senate, 100 Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1988) [hereinafter Liability
Hearings] (statement of Courtney A. Stadd, Director, OCST).
28. For a more extensive analysis of the Launch Act, see Straubel, supra note 26, at
950-65; Comment, supra note 1, at 110-15.
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States territory or by a "United States citizen"2 unless OCST
has issued a license permitting the activity 30 OCST will issue a
license only after the applicant obtains the requisite safety and
mission approvals.31 The safety approval focuses on the actual
launch of the vehicle and is a simple process if the applicant in-
tends to use a federally operated range or launch facility 32 The
mission approval, which includes interaction with other federal
agencies, focuses on the payload.33 The purpose of this review pro-
cess is to "ensure that a proposed launch and any accompanying
payloads do not endanger public safety ,,34
The Launch Act was "a good start for the development of a
viable private launch industry in the United States [because it]
create[d] the framework for developing a workable regulating bu-
reaucracy "35 However, the Act still had basic problems.3 6 Essen-
tially, the Act did not create an environment in which private in-
dustry could compete successfully within the domestic or
international marketplace.3 7 Domestically, NASA had a "stran-
29. The Launch Act defines "United States citizen" as:
(A) any individual who is a citizen of the United States;
(B) any corporation, partnership, joint venture, association, or other entity
organized or existing under the laws of the United States or any State; and
(C) any corporation, partnership, joint venture, association, or other entity
which is organized or exists under the laws of a foreign nation, if the controlling
interest is held by an individual or entity described in subparagraph (A) or
(B).
49 U.S.C. § 2603(12) (1988).
30. See id. § 2605(a). The licensing regulations are published in their entirety in
Commercial Space Transportation: Licensing Regulations, 14 C.F.R. §§ 400-499 (1988)
("These regulations set forth the procedures and requirements applicable to the authoriza-
tion of all space launch activities.").
31. Straubel, supra note 26, at 955 (citing 51 Fed. Reg. 6870, 6875 (1986) (codified
at 14 C.F.R. § 415.5 (1990))).
32. Id. There is a "presumption of safety afforded federal ranges and [previously]
licensed private sites," while new sites face a "long and complicated" safety review. Id. at
955, 957. See generally Boehler, supra note 2, at 40 (Space Services had to follow a "pa-
per trail through some 18 government agencies" to launch its first Conestoga One rocket).
33. Straubel, supra note 26, at 958. For example, OCST must consult the Depart-
ment of State for foreign policy considerations and the Department of Defense for national
security considerations regarding each proposed payload. Id.
34. Id. at 955.
35. Id. at 965.
36. Straubel recommends specific steps which, if taken, would improve the effective-
ness of the Launch Act. Included among the recommendations are establishment of mini-
mum safety standards, incentives for development of private space transportation, and
streamlining the regulatory system. Id. at 965-67.
37. SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, COMMERCIAL
SPACE LAUNCH ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1988, S. REP. No. 593, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2,
[Vol. 41:503
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The most significant section of the Amendments provides that
the United States will pay any "successful claims of a third
party against the licensee," resulting from the licensee's space
launch activities, "for death, bodily injury, or loss of or damage to
property "63 if "the aggregate of claims arising out of
any particular launch: (A) is in excess of the amount of insurance
or demonstration of financial responsibilities required and
(B) is not in excess of the level that is $1,500,000,000
above such amount."'" Thus, the federal government will pay any
successful damage claims by third parties totaling more than $500
million and less than $2 billion. Any claims for more than $2 bil-
lion will be the full responsibility of the licensee. The only excep-
tion to federal coverage of excess claims is for injuries or damages
resulting from the "willful misconduct" of the licensee.6 5
The Launch Amendments also establish prerequisites for
payment by the United States. The government requires notice of
any claim arising from a particular launch agreement, the oppor-
tunity to participate in the defense of a licensee, and approval of
the Secretary of Transportation for payment from appropriated
funds.6 "The purpose of these conditions is to ensure that the
United States is fully aware and involved in litigation or proceed-
ings which [may] lead to the disposition of claims against
licensees.16 7
In addition, the Secretary is authorized to withhold payment
upon determining that a claim is "not just and reasonable." 68 This
provision applies to out-of-court settlements negotiated among the
interested parties, with or without governmental involvement.6 9
All "final judgment[s] of a court of competent jurisdiction," must
be considered "just and reasonable." 70 Although the term "court
of competent jurisdiction" has not been defined, the apparent in-
tent of Congress is to honor any judgment rendered pursuant to a
63. Id. § 2615(b)(1). This payment would include any "reasonable expenses of litiga-
tion or settlement." Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See id. § 2615(b)(2). What constitutes "notice" to the federal government is not
clear from the text or history of the legislation. Presumably, the licensee is required to
notify the government immediately upon learning of claims against it in order to ensure
indemnity of any damage award above the limits of its insurance coverage.
67. S. REP. No. 593, supra note 37, at 18.
68. 49 U.S.C. § 2615(b)(3) (1988).
69. See S. REP. No. 593. supra note 37, at 19.
70. 49 U.S.C. § 2615(b)(3).
1991]
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judicial proceeding in which the government had an opportunity
to participate. 71
C. Practicality and Application of Domestic Law
Overall, the Launch Amendments provide an excellent legal
foundation on which to build a commercially successful private
space enterprise. By separating launch services personnel from po-
tential third party litigants, licensees are able to group the most
unpredictable risks into a single category covered by a separate
insurance policy Therefore, the insurance policy may be adjusted
as data is gathered concerning the initial ascent portion of a par-
ticular company's launches, a period of the launch that threatens
only launch facility personnel. Likewise, third party liability insur-
ance may be adjusted to match the perceived risks presented by
down-range and orbital aspects of a particular satellite launch.72
The cap on liability insurance also provides a significant in-
centive for development of the private space industry By specify-
ing a limit on insurance, licensees have a firm monetary figure to
use for planning and pricing space launches. As a result, the licen-
see will not have to "bet the company" every time it proceeds with
a launch.73 Furthermore, the public is likely to accept the Launch
Amendments' insurance cap because the federal government
agrees only to share liability for harm to third parties.7 4
Critics contend that the $100 million limit on a licensee's in-
71. See S. REP. No. 593, supra note 37, at 18-22 (discussing the conditions for gov-
ernment payment of damage claims).
72. Down-range injury to third parties is unlikely because both of the United States'
primary launch facilities, the Eastern Test Range at Cape Canaveral, Florida, and the
Western Test Range at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, are relatively isolated from
populated areas and are adjacent to oceans. The remaining possibility of third party risk is
the uncontrolled reentry of an orbiting satellite. One source estimates that 7,000 trackable
objects (satellites and miscellaneous debris) are currently in earth's orbit. Baker, Space
Debris: Law and Policy in the United States, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 8, 55 (1989).
73. See State of the Commercial Launch Industry: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Space Science and Applications of the House Comm. on Science and Technology,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 355 (1987) (statement of John F Yardley, President, McDonnell
Douglas Astronautics Co.) (discussing the risk assumed by private launch enterprises due
to the limitations on or nonavailability of liability insurance).
74. See Comment, supra note 1, at 141 (an insurance cap of the type included in the
Launch Amendments is "not the first time the Government has shared third party
liability risks with industry."). Prior statutory liability caps have been upheld as constititu-
tional even without governmental indemnification. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (upholding statutory cap on a nuclear power
utility's liability).
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surance protecting government property is inadequate for complex
and expensive launch facilities like those used by the Titan pro-
grams.7 5 This argument is of questionable validity because the
worst accident involving a Titan booster caused the government
$60 million in property damage .7  Although a more severe acci-
dent is conceivable, the $100 million insurance limit is adequate,
especially considering that the privately obtained insurance will
provide "a form of protection for loss or damage to Government
property that never before has been available in launch
operations. 77
The $500 million cap on liability insurance for third party
protection also has been criticized, primarily because it discour-
ages the purchase of additional insurance coverage available at
reasonable rates.7 8 This could harm licensees, who are responsible
for paying damages exceeding the $2 billion governmental limit.
Furthermore, the insurance cap may interfere with the world in-
surance market. In fact, representatives of the insurance industry
have recommended replacing the $500 million lirriit for third
party liability with an upper limit of the maximum liability insur-
ance reasonably available on the world market.7 9 As long as the
price is reasonable, the licensee would not be adversely affected.
Although these arguments have merit, they enrich the insurance
industry at the expense of the space industry because of the uncer-
75. See Liability Hearings, supra note 27, at 10-11 (statement of Thomas S. Moor-
man, Jr., Director of Space and SDI Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force - Acquisitions) (the $100 million limit is inadequate for certain launch pads, in-
cluding the Titan facility, valued in excess of $300 million); cf. id. at 23-24 (statement of
OCST Director Stadd concerning the advantages of the Launch Amendments' insurance
requirement).
76. See S. REP. No. 593, supra note 37, at 12 (discussing the rationale for the $100
million limitation).
77. Id. Therefore, the contractual arrangement provided by the Launch Amend-
ments benefits both parties. The government is protected against foreseeable damage to its
launch pad by the licensee's insurance, while the licensee is protected against unforeseeable
loss by the government's assumption of that risk. Liability Hearings, supra note 27, at 23-
24 (statement of OCST Director Stadd).
78. The insurance industry has argued:
A statutory cap on private insurance can be viewed by underwriters as a disin-
centive to optimize insurance capacity in support of the U.S. commercial launch
industry. Further, such a cap would directly conflict with the well-established
policy that any Government indemnity should not compete with the activities of
private insurers.
Liability Hearings, supra note 27, at 78 (statement of James W Barrett, President, Inter-
national Technology Underwriters).
79. Id.
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tainty about what constitutes the maximum amount "reasonably
available."
Congress established the $500 million insurance limit after
careful consideration of the insurance and space launch industries.
The figure of $500 million was chosen because it is the amount of
liability required by NASA for payloads carried by the space
shuttle.80 No past claims have exceeded $500 million.8" The lim-
ited insurance requirement reduces the exposure of private space-
craft launchers to the unpredictable insurance market. In other
words, the cost of available insurance varies with the success or
failure of past launches.82 By limiting the amount of insurance
required, Congress is actually keeping the insurance companies
from overextending themselves. Therefore, a single, catastrophic
accident will probably not "overwhelm the capacity of the market-
place or the ability of a launch operator to pay the premiums
that may be charged" for future launches.83
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING SPACE LAUNCHES
A. Treaties
The international law governing the United States' outer
space activities consists of four multinational treaties 4 and "cus-
tomary space law "85 The treaties are the Outer Space Treaty,88
80. See S. REP. No. 593, supra note 37, at 10.
81. Id.
82. In 1983, a successful year for United States space programs, underwriters real-
ized a 10% profit. In 1984, however, underwriters suffered an 80% loss following a series
of unsuccessful launches. Id. at 4. Because of the volatility of the spacecraft insurance
market, premiums have increased from 5-7% of a satellite's value for a launch in 1983 to
as much as 30% of a satellite's value. Id. at 9.
83. Id. at 10. It is important to note that space launch entrepreneurs purchase forms
of insurance other than liability insurance for each launch. For instance, a Titan III carry-
ing two satellites may require $250 million in property insurance for the satellites in addi-
tion to the $500 million third party liability insurance and the $100 million government
property insurance. Therefore, the total insurance coverage for this particular booster
would be $850 million. Id. This is especially overwhelming if other major launches take
place soon before or after the Titan launch.
84. A fifth treaty, the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1434,, has not
been ratified by the United States because of ambiguous legal and political terminology.
See Space Law: The "Big Five," BARRISTER, Winter 1988, at 30, 30. Prior to the ratifica-
tion of these treaties, nations had a claim of right or privilege to act in outer space in
accordance with customary international law. The limits of their actions would be deter-
mined largely by the reactions of other nations. See H. STEINER & D. VAGTS. TRANSNA-
TIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMs 300 (3d ed. 1986).
85. See M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & 1. VLASIC. LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN
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the Rescue and Return Agreement, 7 the Liability Convention,88
and the Registration Convention. 9 Customary space law is "a
process of accumulation and stabilization of patterns of uniformi-
ties" occurring in the legal relations among nations interested in
exploring outer space.90 Essentially, customary space law, which
recognizes equal rights of access to outer space, evolved from the
international response to the first space launches. 91 Although cus-
tomary space law still exists, it now serves primarily as back-
ground to the four treaties. This note will consider only two of the
treaties, the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention, be-
cause they expressly address issues of third party liability in the
international context.
The Outer Space Treaty, which has been referred to as the
"Magna Charta for the exploration and use of outer space,"92 is
the "main base for the legal order of the space environment."98
The stated purpose of this treaty is to "contribute to broad inter-
SPACE 105 (1969) (discussing origins and development of customary space law).
86. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18
U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty] (de-
claring outer space free from claims of national sovereignty and limiting signatories to
peaceful use thereof).
87. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Re-
turn of Objects Launched in Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7572, T.I.A.S. No.
6599, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 (mandating assistance in recovery and return of foreign astronauts
and spacecraft).
88. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 2392, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, at 4, 961 U.N.T.S. 187, 189
[hereinafter Liability Convention] (assigning responsibility to launching nation for dam-
ages caused by its spacecraft).
89. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14,
1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. No. 8480, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 (requires the registration of all
spacecraft with the United Nations). For a discussion of all four treaties, see Note, The
Case for a Federal Common Law of Space, 33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 509, 516-20 (1988).
90. M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & 1. VLASIC, supra note 85, at 105.
91. Since the first Sputnik launch in October 1957,
"numerous earth-orbiting satellites have repeatedly passed over the land
and territorial waters of every nation on earth. No permission was sought in
advance by the launching State, none was expressly given by any State, and not
a single protest has been registered by any State. The only conclusion that may
reasonably be drawn is that nations have not regarded territorial sover-
eignty as extending as high as the point at which the orbiting of these satellites
has occurred."
Id. at 200 n.7 (quoting Johnson, The Future of Manned Space Flight, and the Freedom of
Outer Space, NASA News Release No. 61-53, at 5-6 (Aug. 4, 1962)).
92. Baker, supra note 72, at 70 n.91.
93. C. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 20 (1982).
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national co-operation in the scientific as well as the legal aspects
of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes." 4
The relevant provisions of this treaty are included in articles VI
and VII. Article VI provides: "States Parties to the Treaty shall
bear international responsibility for national activities in outer
space whether such activities are carried on by governmental
agencies or by non-governmental entities ,95 Article VII
provides: "[E]ach State Party from whose territory or facility an
object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to another
State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by
such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space or in
outer space "196
The Outer Space Treaty provides only a general framework
from which to develop and build international space law Article
VI simply places responsibility for all national outer space activi-
ties on the respective government, even when the actual launch is
accomplished by a private organization. This provision effectively
prevents unregulated or unsupervised private launches.97 There-
fore, the United States is ultimately responsible for the interna-
tional consequences of private American space launches. This re-
sponsibility accounts for the complex federal licensing process
presently imposed upon private launching agencies.9"
Similarly, Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty was in-
cluded only to establish the "general principle" that a launching
State is liable for damages or injuries caused to other countries
and their nationals.9 9 The wording was purposely left "very brief
94. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 86, preamble, 18 U.S.T. at 2411, T.I.A.S. No.
6347, at 1, 610 U.N.T.S. at 207. The treaty "provides limits on military activities beyond
earth, prevents the extension of terrestrial sovereignty to space or celestial bodies, and es-
tablishes a framework for the further development of law governing activity in outer
space." G. REYNOLDS & R. MERGES, supra note 15, at 62.
95. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 86, art. VI, 18 U.S.T. at 2415, T.I.A.S. No.
6347, at 6, 610 U.N.T.S. at 209.
96. Id. art. VII, 18 U.S.T. at 2415, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, at 6, 610 U.N.T.S. at 209.
97. See E. VAN BOGAERT, ASPECTS OF SPACE LAW 44 (1986). Article VI "assures
that the parties cannot escape their international obligations by virtue of the fact that
activity in outer space is conducted through the medium of nongovernmental entities."
G. REYNOLDS & R. MERGES, supra note 15, at 74.
98. The Secretary of Transportation approves and issues licenses to private launching
organizations in accordance with the provisions set forth by 49 U.S.C. §§ 2605-2609
(1988).
99. This provision does not apply to injuries occurring to nationals of the launching
state. This conforms to traditional international law, which holds that the relationship be-
tween a state and its citizens is governed by that state's law. E. VAN BOGAERT. supra note
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and simple" because "[a]ny additional details might [have dealt]
too rapidly with problems which had not yet been settled."100 For
instance, the parties used the term "internationally liable"' 01 be-
cause they could not agree on specific terms for absolute liabil-
ity 102 The issue was left for resolution by future international
agreements and customary space law development.
The 1972 Liability Convention expands the basic interna-
tional liability concepts set forth in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty
The Liability Convention adds more efficient legal provisions and
definitions, including several dealing with the liability of private
organizations to foreign third parties.
First, the Liability Convention defines "damage" as "loss of
life, personal injury or other impairment of health; or loss of or
damage to property of States or of persons, natural or juridical
"103 The precise meaning of "damage" is not readily appar-
ent from this definition. For instance, the words "loss of life, per-
sonal injury or impairment of health" have been interpreted to
include "not only physical injury but also injury affecting mental
as well as social well-being.' 0 4 Additional debate focuses on
whether physical manifestation of mental harm is required for fi-
nancial recovery 105
The intention of the parties to the Liability Convention was
to limit recoverable damages to those resulting directly from the
96, at 163-64.
100. Dembling & Arons, The Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty, 33 J. AIR L. &
COM. 419, 438 (1967).
101. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 86, art. VII, 18 U.S.T. at 2415, T.I.A.S. No.
6347, at 6, 610 U.N.T.S. at 209.
102. See G. REYNOLDS & R. MERGES, supra note 15, at 75.
103. Liability Convention, supra note 88, art. 1(a), 24 U.S.T. at 2392, T.I.A.S. No.
7762, at 4, 961 U.N.T.S. at 189.
104. See S. GOROVE, STUDIES IN SPACE LAW: ITS CHALLENGE AND PROSPECTS 124
(1977). Gorove supports his interpretation by drawing on the World Health Organization's
definition of "health"- "'[A] state of complete physical, mental and social well-being.'" Id.
at 125 (quoting the Preamble to the Constitution of the World Health Organization, re-
printed in Final Acts of the International Health Conference, U.N. Doc. E/ 155, at I1
(1946)).
105. See Bosco, Practical Analysis of International Third Party Liability for Outer
Space Activities - A U.S. Perspective, 29 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 298, 340 (1985) (arguing
that recovery of "lost profits, loss of earning capacity, interest, sentimental value, and pain
and suffering" is uncertain under the treaty). But see Foster, The Convention on Interna-
tional Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 10 CAN. Y.B. 137, 155 (1972) (ar-
guing that it "is clear that all injuries to persons are covered whether or not they are
accompanied by objective or substantially harmful physical or psychopathological
consequences").
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outer space activity 106 Specifically, "remote or indirect damage
for which there is only a hypothetical causal connection with
a particular space activity" is not covered by the provisions of the
convention. 10 7 In light of this intention, parties to the treaty dis-
agreed sharply about the treatment of radiation and radioactive
fallout damage caused by a malfunctioning nuclear powered satel-
lite.108 Eventually, however, the parties signed the agreement with
the understanding that such damage, even if it were not discov-
ered until years after an accident, would be covered by the Liabil-
ity Convention. 0"
Without further modification of the international agreement,
the exact definition of damages will be determined during actual
claim disputes. "Unquestionably, in the field of space tort law, the
issue of damages will by far be the most disputed."" 01
Second, the treaty provides that a launching state that is also
responsible for the activities of its private agencies "shall be abso-
lutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space
object on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight."'' This
provision clearly holds a state liable for all damages inflicted by a
private launch agency regardless of fault. The imposition of abso-
lute liability is justified because "the state for whose benefit the
risk was created should bear the loss unavoidably entailed in space
activities rather than the random victim.""'
Third, the Liability Convention outlines methods of claim
presentation and resolution. Presentation of any claim made
against the launching state under the terms of this convention
must be made through the state that suffered injury, or whose nat-
106. S. GOROVE, supra note 104, at 125 n.8 (A launching state is only liable for
damages "'traceable directly to the launching, flight and re-entry of a space object or
associated launch vehicle.' ") (quoting STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON AERONAUTICAL AND
SPACE SCIENCES, 92D CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL LIA-
BILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED BY SPACE OBJECTS 24 (Comm. Print 1972)).
107. Id.
108. "[T]he Soviet Union and the delegations from Eastern Europe defended the
opinion that nuclear damage should be the object of a separate convention or that it
could be regulated by an amendment to the Vienna Convention of 1963 on Liability for
Nuclear Damage." E. VAN BOGAERT, supra note 97, at 172. Other parties felt the Liability
Convention would be incomplete without the inclusion of radiation damages. Id.
109. Id. at 173.
10. Bosco, supra note 105, at 332.
11i. Liability Convention, supra note 88, art. II, 24 U.S.T. at 2392, T.I.A.S. No.
7762, at 4, 961 U.N.T.S. at 189.
112. Foster, supra note 105, at 151.
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ural or juridical persons suffered injury,113 within one year of its
occurrence.114 However, if the state of nationality fails to make a
claim, the state in which the injury occurred may present a claim
on behalf of any person "in respect of damage sustained in its
territory "115 Furthermore, if neither of the previously mentioned
States presents a claim, the State of an injured party's permanent
residence may present a claim "in respect of damage sustained by
its permanent residents." '116 These provisions apparently permit an
injured party to petition up to three different countries to present
a claim on its behalf. However, "it is not clear when the period
that a State of nationality [or state of injury] has for presenting a
claim will be finished. Furthermore, this article does not require
an applicant state to ascertain whether or not the state of nation-
ality intended to present the claim. ' 117
Settlement of a claim must be sought first through diplomatic
channels between the claimant state and the launching state.118 If
no settlement is reached within one year, the parties must estab-
lish a Claims Commission 1 9 consisting of a three member board
chosen by the parties.1 20 The Claims Commission must render a
decision within one year of its formation. 2'
The recovery scheme presented by the Liability Convention
guarantees expeditious adjudication because a decision must be
rendered, either diplomatically or through the Claims Commis-
sion, within two years after the claim is made. 22 Furthermore, a
claimant is "assured of seeking redress from an entity which is
capable of providing full compensation.'1 2 3 However, there is
113. Liability Convention, supra note 88, art. VIII(l), 24 U.S.T. at 2395, T.I.A.S.
No. 7762, at 7, 961 U.N.T.S. at 191.
114. Id. art. X, at 2396, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, at 8, 961 U.N.T.S. at 191.
115. Id. art. VIII(2), at 2395, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, at 7, 961 U.N.T.S. at 191.
116. Id. art. VIII(3), at 2395, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, at 7, 961 U.N.T.S. at 191.
117. Diederiks-Verschoor, The Convention on International Liability Caused by
Space Objects, in 15 PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTEENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF
OUTER SPACE 96, 101 (1972) (criticizing the provisions as not "as clear as they should
be").
118. Liability Convention, supra note 88, art. IX, 24 U.S.T. at 2396, T.I.A.S. No.
7762, at 8, 961 U.N.T.S. at 191.
119. Id., art. XIV, at 2398, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, at i0, 961 U.N.T.S. at 192.
120. Id., art. XV, at 2398, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, at 10, 961 U.N.T.S. at 192.
121. Id., art. XIX(3), at 2400, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, at 12, 961 U.N.T.S. at 193.
122. Two years is the sum of the time allowed for diplomatic resolution provided by
article XIV and the time allowed for Claims Commission resolution provided by article
XIX(3). See supra text accompanying notes 119-21.
123. Bosco, supra note 105, at 309.
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some question as to the enforceability of any damage awards
made by the Claims Commission.12
4
In dual nationality cases, the Liability Convention provides
that an injured third party who is a national of the launching state
may not seek recovery under the Liability Convention, even if the
party is also a national of a foreign country 125 This provision is
consistent with international rules providing that "[a] State may
not afford diplomatic protection to one of its nationals against a
State whose nationality such person also possesses."' 28 Further-
more, the Liability Convention may not be used as a means of
recovery by foreign nationals participating in the launch of the
space vehicle in the launching state.127
Fourth, "[p]resentation of a claim to a launching State for
compensation for damage shall not require the prior exhaus-
tion of any local remedies which may be available to a claimant
"1128 With this provision, the Liability Convention explicitly
provides an exception to the classic international rule that a
claimant must first exhaust all attempts at local redress before
seeking diplomatic intervention.1 29 Claimants, therefore, benefit
because the extensive time periods often associated with compli-
cated international litigation may be avoided.' 30 However, by cir-
cumventing the local judicial system, an injured party may forfeit
valuable discovery rights, especially if the launching state is the
United States.' 3 ' Furthermore, according to the Liability Conven-
tion, a claimant may not simultaneously pursue claims in national
124. See Foster, supra note 105, at 175 (The Claims Commission, created by article
XIV, "cannot be said to lay down an effective procedure at best it assures a claimant
state a reasonable prospect of the payment of compensation.").
125. Liability Convention, supra note 88, art. VII(a), 24 U.S.T. at 2395, T.I.A.S.
No. 7762, at 7, 961 U.N.T.S. at 191.
126. Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws,
Apr. 12, 1930, art. 4, 179 L.N.T.S. 89, 101. But cf. United States ex rel. Merge v. Italy,
22 I.L.R. 443 (Italian-United States Conciliation Commission 1955) (holding that the
United States may bring a claim against Italy on behalf of a citizen of both countries).
127. Liability Convention, supra note 88, art. VII(b), 24 U.S.T. at 2395, T.I.A.S.
No. 7762, at 7, 961 U.N.T.S. at 191.
128. Id., art. XI, at 2397, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, at 9, 961 U.N.T.S. at 191-92.
129. See E. VAN BOGAERT. supra note 97, at 181 (citing C. AMERASINOHE, STATE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 171 (1967); T. HAESLER, THE EXHAUSTION OF
LOCAL REMEDIES IN THE CASE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 69
(1968)).
130. Foster, supra note 105, at 170; see text accompanying notes 118-21.
131. See generally Foster, supra note 105, at 172 (describing the procedure under
the treaty).
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courts and under the terms of the Liability Convention. 13 2
Fifth, the compensation for which the launching state may be
held liable "shall be determined in accordance with international
law and the principles of justice and equity,;in order to re-
store the person, State or international organisation on whose
behalf the claim is presented to the condition which would have
existed if the damage had not occurred. 133 This provision, consid-
ered the "'heart of the Convention'" by the Legal Sub-Commit-
tee Chairman,134 is quite vague, but its purpose is to eliminate any
inequities which may result from mechanical implementation of a
choice-of-law rule.135 For instance, Belgium sought to apply the
national law of the injured party, France favored adopting the law
of the place of injury, and the Soviet Union advocated applying
the law of the launching state.113 The resulting compromise elimi-
nated all reference to national law Consequently, diplomatic ne-
gotiations and possible arbitration by the Claims Commission will
rely on "international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law"' 37 and "general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations."'
In summary, the treaties establishing liability of launching
states for the actions of their governmental and non-governmental
agencies are manifestly plaintiff oriented.' 3 9 They do, however,
form a solid working foundation, despite some possible problems,
for international cooperation in the development of outer space.140
132. Liability Convention, supra note 88, art. XI, 24 U.S.T. at 2397, T.I.A.S. No.
7762, at 9, 961 U.N.T.S. at 192.
133. Id., art. XII, at 2397, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, at 9, 961 U.N.T.S. at 192.
134. Recent Treaties and Statutes, Space Law - Convention on Liability - Proce-
dure Established to Enforce Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 6 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 262, 267 n.41 (1972) (quoting 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) Comm. on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (98th mtg.) at 28, U.N. Doc. A/8420 (1971) (statement
of Eugeniusz Wyzner, Legal Sub-Committee Chairman)).
135. See Bosco, supra note 105, at 333-39 (discussing potential inequities of rigid
choice-of-law rules). For example, after the Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal, India on
December 3, 1984, many victims sought recovery in United States courts, where liberal
compensation rules were likely to yield large damage awards. Id. at 338 n.65.
136. E. VAN BOGAERT, supra note 97, at 173.
137. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 1060, T.S. No. 993, at 30 (incorporated at U.N. CHARTER art. 92).
138. Id. art. 38(c), at 1060, T.S. No. 993, at 30.
139. See Foster, supra note 105, at 149-63 (for example, the principle of absolute
liability is extended to suits against governments acting in their official capacities, an un-
usual exception to governmental immunity).
140. Id. at 183-84 (concluding that the convention, though limited in application,
represents "a step forward in the developments of the legal regulation of space
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Fortunately, the international community has had few opportum-
ties to test the agreements.
B. Past Application of International Space Law
Although various satellites, including Skylab, have reentered
earth's atmosphere,1 41 the only one which really tested the existing
treaties on the issue of damages was the January 24, 1978 reentry
of COSMOS 954 142
COSMOS 954 was a nuclear powered Soviet surveillance sat-
ellite that crashed after an uncontrolled reentry into Canada's
Northwest TerritoriesY.41 The satellite reentered after a failed So-
viet attempt to raise it into a higher orbit, where it would have
remained for hundreds of years.144  Fortunately, the satellite,
which passed over every country in the world at least twice a
day, 45 crashed into an uninhabited region of the Canadian wilder-
ness. The satellite spread radioactive debris over an area of
activities").
141. Skylab reentered the earth's upper atmosphere over Maine and finally ended its
fiery descent in Australia on July 12, 1979. The 77.5 ton craft broke into approximately
500 pieces, including two weighing two tons each. See Skylab s Spectacular Death, supra
note 14, at 35. Other unplanned satellite reentries include two of the United States' nuclear
powered System for Nuclear Auxiliary Power ("SNAP") satellites, which fell harmlessly
into the ocean after reentering the earth's atmosphere in 1968 and 1970. See M. BENKO.
W DEGRAAF & G. REIJNEN, SPACE LAW IN THE UNITED NATIONs 54 (1985); Straubel,
supra note 13, at 193-94 (discussing safety concerns surrounding the use of nuclear power
sdurces in space, including the potential spread of radioactive material over the earth
caused by satellite reentries).
142. See, e.g., Straubel, supra note 13, at 204 ("The crash of COSMOS 954 pro-
vided an excellent opportunity to test the utility of the Liability Convention [although]
[t]he exact role played by the Liability Convention in settling Canada's claim may never
be known."); Note, Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects: Definition and Determination of Damages After the COSMOS 954 Incident, 8
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 255, 256 (1985) (the COSMOS incident represents the only case in-
voking the Liability Convention).
In contrast, the Skylab reentry caused no international incident. The United States
offered financial assistance to Australia, but none was needed because "[n]o injuries -
even to a stray kangaroo - were reported." Skylab s Spectacular Death, supra note 14, at
36. This is particularly fortuitous because Skylab passed directly over the coastal city of
Esperance, population 9,000, as it broke apart. See Riggert, Skylab s Fiery Finish, 156
NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 581, 581-84 (1979).
143. See generally M. BENKO. W DEGRAAFF & G. REIJNEN, supra note 141, at 49-
51 (account of the COSMOS 954 crash); Note, supra note 142, at 270-71 (describing the
circumstances surrounding the accident, including the extent of the radioactive contamina-
tion and clean-up efforts). Some of the satellite debris registered lethal levels of radiation.
Id. at 50.
144. See Straubel, supra note 13, at 190.
145. M. BENKO, W DEGRAAFF & G. REIJNEN. supra note 141, at 50.
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124,000 square miles.14
The United States assisted Canada in the cleanup, called Op-
eration Morninglight, which finally cost Canada $13.97 million.147
However, Canada decided to claim only $6.94 million from the
Soviet Union as compensation for the cleanup.'48 After extensive
negotiations, the Soviet Union responded by paying only $3 mil-
lion, arguing that Canada had taken excessive measures to restore
the environment. 14
9
Canada presented its claim against the Soviet Union approxi-
mately one year after the accident.8 0 The claim was based on the
Liability Convention and "general principles of international
law "'5' The dispute arose because, according to some interpreta-
tions of the Liability Convention, Canada actually incurred no
damages since the hazardous radioactive debris was scattered only
over uninhabited wilderness. 2
The COSMOS 954 incident illustrates one of the Liability
Convention's main weaknesses: its definition of damages is too
vague.153 The conflict between the two countries finally was re-
solved, primarily through diplomatic circumvention of the Liabil-
ity Convention.154 Consequently, the incident "provides almost no
guidance" with respect to future application of the Liability Con-
vention. 155 The incident did, however, result in the establishment
146. Note, supra note 142, at 271.
147. See Straubel, supra note 13, at 189-90. All amounts are expressed in Canadian
National Dollars.
148. Id. at 191.
149. Id.
150. Note, supra note 142, at 273.
151. Id. at 274. The Canadian government focused on the Liability Convention more
than international law principles. Id. at 274 n.90.
152. See id. at 276. The Canadians claimed the environment was rendered "unfit for
use." Id. However, others contended that "there was no such damage [as contemplated by
the Liability Convention] since there was no loss of life, no personal injuries involved, or
other impairment of health." Id. at 276 n.98.
153. See id. at 279-80. The drafters of the Liability Convention "realized that no
consensus could be reached on the formulation of damage law to be applied for space
activities." Bosco, supra note 105, at 333-34. Therefore, only general guidelines were es-
tablished. Id. This compromise complicates the damage recovery issue. It is an "ambiguity
[that] undercuts the basic purpose of the Liability Convention, which is to provide effective
rules and procedures for the prompt payment of compensation to victims " Note,
supra note 142, at 285.
154. See Note, supra note 142, at 280.
155. Id. "Due to the diplomatic nature of the resolution, there was no opportunity to
see how the substantive provisions of the Liability Convention would work in the context of
a satellite reentry and crash." Id. at 280 n.i 18 (quoting Address by L.H. Legault & A.
Farand, Canada's Claim for Damage Caused by the Soviet COSMOS 954 Satellite, at 19-
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of international "norms" to assist in diplomatic resolution of fu-
ture disputes involving outer space:
The norms established by the Cosmos 954 incident provide
that the major satellite launching nations - the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. - notify each other of hazardous events due to satel-
lite failure, relay information to facilitate damage control, assist
their political allies in cleanup operations, and share the cost of
compensating the state injured by a falling satellite, regardless
of whose satellite caused the injury and regardless of fault. 156
Whether these norms, in conjunction with the Liability Conven-
tion, would apply to current spacecraft accidents has yet to be
determined.
III. A PROPOSAL FOR FEDERAL ACTION
The federal government should create legal guidelines that
coordinate domestic and international laws governing private en-
terprise in outer space. To accomplish this, further steps must be
taken to simplify application of space law First, a comprehensive
body of federal statutory and common law regarding commercial
space activities must be developed. The federal laws should ex-
pressly preempt individual state tort actions and attempt to har-
monize United States internal law with the internal law of other
nations. 51 The European Economic Community is an example of
such harmonization in the economic arena: "In practice, [harmo-
nization] is concerned with mutual adjustment of national regula-
tions to an agreed standard, with the approximation of mem-
ber states' laws to the extent required for the proper functioning
of the common market."'15 Second, the existing treaties governing
international liability of signatories for their spacecraft launches
must be refined to include specific claims of right and a ceiling for
23, ABA Forum Committee on Air and Space Law, First Annual Forum (Feb. 23-25,
1984)).
156. G. REYNOLDS & R. MERGES, supra note 15, at 174. Despite the lack of relevant
provisions in the existing international agreements, the United States and the Soviet Union
assumed the burden of notifying their respective allies of pending spacecraft accidents. See
id. at 173. Therefore, the two leading nations in the area of space launches, over the objec-
tions of Canada in the COSMOS 954 case, have retained control over outer space activi-
ties. See id.
157. This note will not attempt a comparison of the tort law of all nations that may
be affected by future spacecraft mishaps. It only expresses the desirability of consistency
among nations.
158. Lodge, Introduction: Internal Perspectives, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND
THE CHALLENGE OF THE FUTURE 88 (J. Lodge ed. 1989).
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damages.
A. Domestic Actions
A body of preemptive federal law governing commercial ad-
vancement in outer space would be beneficial to all parties in-
volved. Private industry could better predict possible legal issues
and liability without subjection to the uncertainty of the geo-
graphical location of a space-related accident and the respective
choice-of-law rules. 59 Injured third parties would be treated
equally in similar circumstances, thus preventing disparate litiga-
tion results based solely on the location of the accident. Similarly,
the United States would benefit from the technological advances
that typically follow a successful high technology endeavor. 160 Fi-
nally, domestic organizations would be assured access to outer
space if they could rely on a domestic private space launch enter-
prise, even during times of international crisis when foreign
launch agencies may not be available.
1. Federal Legislation
The federal government is capable of alleviating the pressures
of potential liability on private space launch agencies by refining
statutory regulation of the industry To begin, Congress should
create a statutory cause of action focusing on harm caused di-
rectly by the outer space activities of domestic organizations. The
legislation would provide the exclusive means of recovery 16' avail-
able to injured third parties suing in the state and federal courts
of the United States. Where the injury suffered is death, the legis-
lation would provide a hierarchy of survivors permitted to pursue
claims against the launcher.'6 2 The salient features of this pro-
159. See generally Bosco, supra note 20, at 16-20 (discussing various choice-of-law
and conflict-of-laws rules and their effect on liability to third parties).
160. For instance, the space initiative launched by President John F Kennedy re-
sulted in computer and circuitry advances; improvements in communications and weather
satellites, and navigational systems; and consumer goods, such as rechargeable cardiac
pacemakers, freeze-dried foods, and Teflon. Sandomir, Moon Dreams, Newsday, July 9,
1989, Magazine, at 6.
161. The existing Launch Act already provides an express preemption of "any
[state] law, rule, regulation, standard, or order which is inconsistent with the provisions of
this chapter." 49 U.S.C. § 2620(a) (1988).
162. The Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA") provides a good example of a
hierarchy of claimants: "[Defendant] shall be liable in damages to [the deceased em-
ployee's] personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and
children of such employee; and, if none, then of such employee's parents; and, if none, then
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posed legislation would be the imposition of absolute liability on
launch agencies for damages sustained by third parties and a limit
on recoverable damages. Consequently, litigation arising from a
space accident would focus on the existence and extent of the
plaintiff's damages, either through personal injury or property
damage.1 6 3
The theory behind imposition of absolute liability is identical
to that used to support the absolute liability of aircraft owners and
operators for damages caused by air crashes. The general rule
concerning strict liability of aircraft accidents is:
If physical harm to land or to persons or chattels on the
ground is caused by the ascent, descent, or flight of aircraft, or
by the dropping or falling of an object from the aircraft, (a) the
operator of the aircraft is subject to liability for the harm, even
though he has exercised the utmost care to prevent it, and (b)
the owner of the aircraft is subject to similar liability if he has
authorized or permitted the operation.1 64
If the word "aircraft" were replaced by the word "spacecraft" in
the preceding provision, the result would be an excellent prototype
for a federal statute creating a cause of action against owners and
launchers of spacecraft. 6 5
A strict liability rule is desirable for two reasons. First, public
policy favors imposing strict liability in situations of "one-sided-
ness in receipt of benefits and in creation of risks to others,"' 66
and where "the person harmed would encounter a difficult prob-
lem of proof if some other standard of liability were applied.' 6 7
Furthermore, the ability of the private space industry to distribute
of the next of kin dependent upon such employee " 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988). For
discussion of FELA as a legislative model, see infra text accompanying notes 174-82.
163. The issues of who may seek redress for what types of injury under the proposed
legislation and upon what grounds such redress will be granted are policy questions for
Congress to decide. For a further discussion of various options, see infra text accompanying
notes 184-91.
164. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520A (1977). But see Crosby v. Cox Air-
craft Co., 109 Wash. 2d 581, 746 P.2d 1198 (1987) (liability of aircraft owners and opera-
tor for ground damage determined by negligence standard, not strict liability).
165. Internationally, states also have recognized absolute liability for aircraft dam-
age to ground objects: "The Rome Convention of 1952 for damage on the surface of the
Earth is based on absolute liability, [while] liability for collisions of aircraft [in flight] is
based on fault." E. VAN BOGAERT, supra note 97, at 167.
166. Vold, Strict Liability for Aircraft Crashes and Forced Landings on Ground
Victims Outside of Established Landing Areas, 5 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 3 (1954).
167. Peck, Negligence and Liability Without Fault in Tort Law, 46 WASH. L. REV.
225, 240 (1971).
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the loss through insurance or otherwise justifies imposing strict li-
ability 168 Second, the reduction of the plaintiff's burden from not
having to prove the defendant's culpability offsets the disadvan-
tage of a federal cap on the amount of damages otherwise availa-
ble to the plaintiff."8 9
The creation of a preemptive federal cause of action based on
strict liability is within the constitutional power of Congress.
Courts have held that statutory strict liability is constitutionally
permissible.17 0 Moreover, "[i]t is well established that within con-
stitutional limits Congress may pre-empt state authority by so
stating in express terms." 17' Federal control of the private space
industry would fall within constitutional authorization. The com-
merce clause permits Congress to enact laws regulating activities
that directly or indirectly affect the commerce and economic well-
being of the entire country 12 Also, satellite launches traditionally
have been an exclusive function of the federal government. There-
fore, the government may legislate liability in order to continue
regulatory control of the private space industry, as was done with
nuclear power plants under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.173
Congressional regulation of private enterprise liability to
third parties for damages caused by outer space activities would
resemble other federally controlled liability schemes, including
FELA 74 and the Jones Act. 7 5 FELA provides a negligence-
based, federal cause of action for interstate railroad employees in-
jured in the course of employment. 7 6 FELA preempts all state
168. See Vold, supra note 166, at 5 (strict liability is appropriate when an enterprise
can distribute the cost of its losses to its customers).
169. For an explanation of the proposal to place a cap on damages, see infra text
accompanying notes 184-91.
170. See, e.g., United States v. Coastal States Crude Gathering Co., 643 F.2d 1125
(1981) (Congress has the power to impose a civil penalty on a strict liability basis).
171. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203
(1983) (discussing interpretation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2011
(1988)). In both the Atomic Energy Act and the Space Launch Act of 1984, the federal
government surrendered its monopoly on research and development to private enterprise.
The Atomic Energy Act allowed the federal government to maintain some control of nu-
clear technology, through licensing. Id. at 207; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2073, 2111-2113.
172. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (holding that
the defendant must comply with requirements of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935
because its activities, although apparently local in nature, indirectly affect the national
economy).
173. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1988) (limiting liability for nuclear power licensees).
174. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988).
175. Id. § 688.
176. 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
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causes of action, eliminating various common law defenses such as
contributory negligence and assumption of the risk.177 The Jones
Act gives merchant seamen essentially the same benefits and limi-
tations as FELA provides for interstate railway employees.17 8
Congress passed FELA because it was not satisfied with the
manner in which the individual states handled negligence suits
brought by railroad workers. 17 9 Congress therefore created a uni-
form national rule allowing injured railroad workers to recover
damages, even if contributorily negligent, regardless of the other-
wise applicable state tort law If an employee dies as a result of
the railroad's negligence, the surviving spouse and children are en-
titled to compensation under FELA.180 Consequently, interstate
railroad employers are faced with a "far more drastic duty of pay-
ing damages for injury or death at work due in whole or in part to
the employer's negligence. "181
The obvious benefit of this federal regulation is that railroad
employees are more likely to recover damages. Less obvious, how-
ever, is the benefit received by the employers subject to FELA.
Specifically, they are "protected, in a sense, from the nuances of
law of the several states."' 82 The private space industry would
benefit similarly from federal preemption of the various state
causes of action.
As discussed above, federal regulation of the private space
industry should include a cap on damages. The result would be
greater uniformity and predictability of liability to third parties.
§ 4505, at 56 n.38 (1982).
177. "[T]he fact that the employee may have been guilty of contributory negligence
shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to
the amount of negligence attributable to such employee " 45 U.S.C. § 53.
178. "[W]ith the passage of the Jones Act Congress effectively obliterated all
distinctions between the kinds of negligence for which the shipowner is liable, as well as
limitations imposed by the fellow-servant doctrine, by extending to seamen the remedies
made available to railroad workers under [FELA]." Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362
U.S. 539, 546-47 (1960). Only FELA will be discussed in this note; however, because of
the similarity between the two acts, the Jones Act provisions are equally relevant.
179. See Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 507, reh g dented, 335
U.S. 943 (1957) (noting congressional dfssatisfaction with treatment of railroad negligence
suits under the common law master-servant doctrine).
180. See 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988). FELA further provides a hierarchy of claimants.
See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
181. Rogers, 352 U.S. at 507; accord Heater v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 497
F.2d 1243, 1246 (7th Cir.) (quantum of negligence required under FELA is less than ordi-
nary negligence), cert. dented, 419 U.S. 1013 (1974).
182. Toscano v. Burlington N.R.R. Co., 678 F Supp. 1477, 1479 (D. Mont. 1987).
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One commentator summarized the vast differences in state law as
follows:
There are patently indefensible differences among the laws
of the states regarding damages in wrongful death cases. Under
Florida law, for example, which permits damages for mental
pain and suffering of next of kin, an award of $1.8 million in
damages was affirmed for the death of a 16 year-old boy, as a
result of the crash of a commercial airliner. Indiana law, on the
other hand, limits the damages in such a case to funeral ex-
penses and nominal costs for administering the estate.183
A federally imposed damage limitation for spacecraft
launches already has been considered by the United States. Presi-
dent Reagan's national space policy supported imposition of a
$200,000 cap on the noneconomic damages that an individual may
recover, but Congress chose the "maximum liability insurance
reasonably available" requirement as provided in the Launch
Amendments.184 Noneconomic damages include punitive damages,
which constitute the primary motivation for congressional desire
to limit liability, 85 and damages for pain, suffering, and other
mental or emotional harms for which measurement is difficult.1 86
Noneconomic damages, according to critics, should be eliminated
generally because "they are unusually susceptible to overstate-
ment and abuse. '187 Furthermore, in the event of a catastrophic
space-related accident, the limited amount of insurance provided
by the Launch Amendments would be used primarily to replace
the economic losses of a greater number of claimants.
The cap on damages proposed by this note can be incorpo-
rated into the federal scheme in one of three ways. First, the pre-
viously discussed $200,000 limit on noneconomic damages can be
reinstated, relying solely on state law to provide the specific causes
of action available to plaintiffs claiming such harm. The weakness
183. Kennelly, Aviation, the Need for Uniform Legislation, 48 J. AIR L. & CoM.
613-15 (1983).
184. See Liability Hearings, supra note 27, at 18 (statement of OCST Director
Courtney A. Stadd); Comment, supra note 1, at 141 (discussing liability cap options).
185. See Liability Hearings, supra note 27, at 17 (noting that the congressional in-
tent was to limit punitive damages, which "tend to be the most difficult for corporations to
respond to").
186. See Hicks, Statutory Damage Caps are an Incomplete Reform: A Proposal for
Attorney Fee Shifting in Tort Actions, 49 LA. L. REv. 763, 764 (1989) ("[N]oneconomlc
damages are haphazardly awarded, are marginally related to their ostensible purpose, and
are routinely used as an indirect and covert means of paying plaintiff's legal fees.").
187. Id. at 769.
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in this option is that it would result in varying damage awards to
parties injured in different states.188 For example, states differ on
the treatment of emotional distress damages in absolute liability
actions.' 8 1 One state may allow liberal recovery of emotional dis-
tress damages, requiring only that the injured party be related to
the victim and know of the accident shortly after its occurrence. 90
Another state, however, might deny recovery of emotional harm
unless the close relative who witnesses the accident is also within
the zone of physical danger at the time of its occurrence.19' As a
result, a spacecraft launcher could be absolutely liable for up to
$200,000 for emotional distress caused in one state but would
have no liability for the same type of injury in another state. The
defendant's total liability and the sufficiency of its insurance
would depend entirely on the chance location of the spacecraft
accident.
The second possibility is to create a federal provision that
specifies the theories of noneconomic damage recovery available to
injured third parties. For instance, Congress could adopt a single
approach to emotional distress recovery or even eliminate such re-
covery altogether. Injured third parties would receive equal or
similar noneconomic damage awards regardless of accident loca-
tion. Also, the amount and type of noneconomic damage liability
within the $200,000 limit would be more predictable for the pri-
vate space industry
The third possibility is to allow injured third parties to pursue
any claim recognized by the applicable state law but cap all dam-
ages, economic and noneconomic. This approach would enhance
predictability for spacecraft launchers by establishing the full ex-
tent of their potential liability for each third party claim. Also, the
limited pool of insurance funds would cover a larger number of
188. For a discussion of the benefits of national uniformity in space tort law, see
Note, supra note 89, at 512.
189. See generally Comment, Bystander Recovery: A Policy Oriented Approach, 32
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 877 (1987) (discussing emotional injury law and particularly the vari-
ous standards applied in bystander-recovery cases).
190. See, e.g., Pearsall v. Emhart Indus., Inc., 599 F Supp. 207 (E.D. Pa. 1984),
(allowing recovery of damages for emotional harm in a strict liability action against a
smoke alarm manufacturer, even though the plaintiff was not in any physical danger and
did not actually witness the fire that killed her husband and children).
191. See, e.g., Smith v. Hub Mfg., Inc., 634 F Supp. 1505 (N.D.N.Y 1986) (deny-
ing parents of a drowned boy recovery of damages for emotional distress in a strict prod-
ucts liability action against pool ladder manufacturer because parents were not personally
in danger of physical harm).
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victims before requiring government indemnification of the re-
maining awards. However, limiting all damages would be unfair
to parties that sustain substantial economic loss. Such claimants
would receive inadequate compensation for concrete economic
claims while other victims could receive equal compensation based
exclusively on more intangible, noneconomic damages.
Weighing the above considerations, policy makers should
choose the second approach, which provides specific and exclusive
federal action for recovery of noneconomic damages. Any settle-
ment or litigation could then focus entirely on the legislation, free
of the inconsistencies of state tort law Furthermore, a cap on
noneconomic damages would enhance predictability of potential
liability and ensuing insurance coverage.
2. Federal Common Law
Despite the popular view that the Supreme Court's holding in
Erie Railroad Co. v Tompkins 92 eliminated federal common
law, federal common law still exists, although it is rarely im-
posed.1 93 Federal common law has been reserved for disputes in-
volving "substantially federal interests,' ' 194 including "(1) cases in
which a state is a party, (2) admiralty and maritime cases, (3)
cases concerning 'proprietary' interests of the United States and
(4) proceedings involving international relations." 95 Space law
has many features in common with admiralty and maritime
law, 96 and involves international relations. In addition, as stated
by the court in Sola Electric Co. v Jefferson Electric Co.,' 97 fed-
eral common law is applicable "to those areas of judicial decision
within which the policy of the law is so dominated by the sweep of
federal statutes that legal relations which they affect must be
deemed governed by federal law having its source in those stat-
utes, rather than by local law "98 Given the extensive federal reg-
ulation of space exploration, outer space tort law requires the de-
192. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
193. See Note, supra note 89, at 513. "[Erie] has come to be seen as having pro-
vided the base for a new federal common law and not as having, in any meaningful sense,
established the supremacy of state law." G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMI-
RALTY 459 (2d ed. 1975).
194. Id. at 514.
195. Id.
196. See infra notes 203-08 (comparing space law and maritime law).
197. 317 U.S. 173 (1942).
198. Id. at 176.
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velopment of applicable federal common law standards.
Establishment of federal common law is especially important
in the international realm. In Banco Nacional de Cuba v Sabba-
tino,199 the Supreme Court of the United States recognized the
need for federal common law in cases involving foreign countries.
The Court ruled that "relationships with other members of the
international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect
of federal law" 200 because the "rules of international law should
not be left to divergent and perhaps parochial state interpreta-
tions."201 As a practical matter, "'[t]he need for uniformity in the
law affecting foreign nations is clear, and application of state law
would preclude the attainment of this uniformity' ",202 Establish-
ment of federal common law therefore would enhance efficient ex-
ecution and predictability of the United States' treaties and rele-
vant legislation.
Maritime law, like international law, is another example of a
large body of federal common law In fact, maritime law has been
suggested as a model for development of federal common law for
outer space.203 Furthermore, the complete realm of maritime law,
like that of space law, includes international and domestic issues
involving all vessels registered with the United States.20 4 Admi-
ralty deals with inland waters of the United States205 and the high
seas, while space law deals with the national air space immedi-
199. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
200. Id. at 425.
201. Id. (citing Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to Inter-
national Law, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 740 (1939) (authored by then-Judge Philip C. Jessup of
the International Court of Justice)).
202. Note, supra note 89, at 522 (quoting M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TEN-
SIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 94 (1980)).
203. See, e.g., id. at 524-28 (using maritime law as a "legal model" for outer space
law); M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & I. VLASIC, supra note 85, at 105 ("The fact that a
structure of unorganized inclusive competence has worked so well for several centuries in
regulating the shared enjoyment of the oceans is propitious.").
204. The requirement to register a vessel is provided by the Convention on the High
Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 6(1), 13 U.S.T. 2312, 2315, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, at 4, 450
U.N.T.S. 82, 86. This requirement is similar to that of the Convention on Registration of
Objects Launched into Outer Space, supra note 89. "Ordinarily a state confers its nation-
ality on a ship by registering the ship, authorizing it to fly its flag, and issuing documents
evidencing the ship's nationality." L. SOHN & K. GUSTAFSON, THE LAW OF THE SEA IN A
NUTSHELL 3 (1984).
205. The United States' "jurisdiction includes ports, harbors, bays and other
enclosed arms of the sea along its coast and a marginal belt of the sea extending from the
coastline outward three nautical miles." 1 M. NORRIS. THE LAW OF SEAMEN 10 (3d
ed. 1970).
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ately above the United States °8 and outer space. Of particular
importance is the fact that outer space, which lies beyond the air-
space claimed by any nation, is a res communims, 207 and therefore
not under the jurisdiction of any nation. Consequently, there
should be a "nationally uniform system" of space law, much as
there is such a system of maritime law 208
B. International Measures
The existing treaties governing liability of spacefaring nations
for damage caused by their citizens to foreign third parties estab-
lish a solid legal foundation and encourage global cooperation in
outer space. However, further international agreements, specifying
more precisely the causes of action and damages available to par-
ties injured by foreign outer space activities, are needed. The pros-
pects for a new or modified liability convention are apt to improve
as more nations advance technologically into the space age.209
The international agreement proposed in this note would pro-
vide a rule of absolute liability for injury or damage to third par-
ties caused by the outer space activities of its signatories. As
under the Liability Convention, each state would be liable for its
own outer space activities as well as private space launches from
206. "The United States of America is declared to possess and exercise complete and
exclusive national sovereignty in the airspace of the United States, including the airspace
above all inland waters " 49 U.S.C. § 1508(a) (1988); see Centre for Research of
Air and Space Law, Space Activities and Emerging International Law 356-86 (1984) (un-
published manuscript available from McGill University) (discussing in detail the possible
approaches to delimitation of airspace and outer space). Among the approaches suggested
are the "minimum altitude at which a satellite can orbit, [which is] approximately 80
kilometers," id. at 378, and the maximum altitude at which "the atmosphere supports craft
passing through it," which is 50 to 80 kilometers, id. at 377.
207. Note, supra note 89, at 517 n.61 (defining res communis as those areas that are
beyond the jurisdiction of any nation).
208. Id. at 524-26, (proposing that the nationally uniform system of maritime law be
used as a model for a system of space law); see Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205,
215 (1917) (praising the advantages of the maritime system).
209. Nations developing space programs tend to become more interested in limiting
their own liability and less concerned about protecting their citizens from countries with
better established space programs. There are several countries currently developing space
programs. Israel recently became the latest country to orbit its own satellite. Gauthier, A
Blueprint for the '90s, AD ASTRA, May 1989, at 24, 24. In addition, Saudi Arabia has
purchased missiles and boosters from the People's Republic of China in order to place
satellites in orbit, and India is developing a new launch vehicle. Id., see UN Space Com-
mittee Notes 1988 Achievements by Nations, UN CHRON., June 1989, at 36 (listing inter-
national strides in outer space development).
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its territory or facilities.21 Although the signatories would still be
ultimately responsible for all launches from their facilities, the
proposal would have the effect of holding the actual launching en-
tity, whether public or private, primarily responsible for compen-
sation of third parties, since most countries would probably adopt
insurance requirements for private launches similar to those im-
posed in the United States. In other words, the treaty would cre-
ate an exclusive cause of action under which an injured third
party could seek damages directly from the organization that con-
ducted the outer space activity The nation from which the launch
was conducted, however, would be responsible for providing com-
pensation in excess of the amount the launch agency is able to
pay To assist the launching agencies, the proposed liability treaty,
like the proposed domestic legislation, would place a $200,000
limit on noneconomic damages and provide specific and exclusive
bases for the recovery of noneconomic damages.
An excellent working model for a modern liability treaty is
the Warsaw Convention of 1929 211 The Warsaw Convention "es-
tablish[ed] a uniform body of world-wide liability rules to govern
international aviation, which supersede[d] with respect to in-
ternational flights the scores of differing domestic laws, leaving
the latter applicable only to the internal flights of each of the
countries involved. '212 Specifically, the convention holds negligent
international air carriers liable for damages sustained by a party
for the "death or wounding of a passenger ' 21 a and the "destruc-
tion or loss of any registered luggage or goods" 214 occurring
in the course of an international flight.21 5 However, a carrier's lia-
210. The definition of a "launching state" would be identical to that provided by the
Liability Convention. See Liability Convention, supra note 88, art. l(c), 24 U.S.T. at 2392,
T.I.A.S. No. 7762, at 4, 961 U.N.T.S. at 189.
211. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Car-
riage by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3014, T.S. No. 876, at 16, 137 L.N.T.S. 1I [hereinaf-
ter Warsaw Convention]. The United States' accession to the Warsaw Convention became
effective October 29, 1934. Id. at 3013, T.S. No. 876, at 15, 156 L.N.T.S. 258.
212. Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1090 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922
(1977) (footnote omitted); accord Domangue v. Eastern Air Lines, 722 F.2d 256, 262 (5th
Cir. 1984) (The Warsaw Convention was "intended to act as a uniform international law
wyhich supplants each member nation's varied laws." (citing Block v. Compagnie Nationale
Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 337-38 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968))).
213. Warsaw Convention, supra note 211, art. 17, 49 Stat. at 3018, T.S. No. 876, at
26, 137 L.N.T.S. at 23.
214. Id., art. 18, at 3019, T.S. No. 876, at 21, 137 L.N.T.S. at 23.
215. The Warsaw Convention defines "international carriage" as "any carriage in
which the place of departure and the place of destination are situated within
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bility is limited under the Warsaw Convention to $10,000 for in-
jury to passengers and $9.07 per pound for damage to baggage.2 16
In 1966, the Warsaw Convention was modified by the Mon-
treal Agreement21" in order to prevent the United States from re-
nouncing the convention. 18 Under the Montreal Agreement, the
air carrier is strictly liable and is subject to a larger damage cap
of $75,000.218 Any international air carrier stopping in the United
States at any point from departure to destination is subject to the
terms of the Montreal Agreement.220
The Warsaw Convention, as amended by the Montreal
Agreement, is not an entirely appropriate model for the proposed
outer space liability treaty For instance, the Warsaw Convention
fails to require governmental indemnity for damages exceeding an
air carrier's financial resources. However, the rationale for impos-
ing strict liability is essentially identical: to compensate third par-
ties for the relatively low cap on damages by reducing litigation
time and expense. 221 Conversely, the damage limitation benefits
the tortfeasor in compensation for being held strictly liable.
Implementation of the proposed outer space liability treaty
can be accomplished in two ways. First, the process could simply
parallel that developed by the Warsaw Convention. In the United
States, for example, the treaty would create a cause of action
against the launching organization and preempt conflicting local
the territories of two High Contracting Parties "Id., art. 1, at 3014, T.S. No. 876, at
16, 137 L.N.T.S. at 15.
216. L. GOLDHIRSCH, THE WARSAW CONVENTION ANNOTATED: A LEGAL HAND-
BOOK 93 (1988).
217. Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol, 31
Fed. Reg. 7,302 (1966). "The Montreal Agreement, not a treaty itself but an agreement
among the carriers, did not change the text of the Warsaw Convention. Rather, it modified
the terms of the Convention with respect to international transportation involving a loca-
tion in the United States." Maugme v. Compagme Nationale Air France, 549 F.2d 1256,
1259 n.6 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977). See generally Lowenfeld & Men-
delsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 563-75
(1967) (describing the dissension at the Montreal Convention).
218. L. GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 216, at 7. The United States decided that the War-
saw Convention established unacceptably low limits on carrier liability. A meeting was
therefore held in Montreal to modify the convention in a manner acceptable to the United
States. Id.
219. Id.
220. The international agreement proposed in this note would apply to all space
launches because of the inherently international scope of a spacecraft launch.
221. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 217, at 600 (discussing justifications
for strict liability under the Warsaw Convention).
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law 222 Actual interpretation of the treaty would essentially be de-
veloped through federal common law- "[T]he determination of the
scope of the Warsaw Convention is a matter of federal law and
federal treaty interpretation. Conflicts principles are not applica-
ble in interpreting the words of the Convention; rather, the mean-
ing should be ascertained from the intention of the drafters
and the goals of the Convention." '22
A problem could arise, however, through reliance on national
court interpretations of the proposed outer space liability treaty
Specifically, if capped noneconomic damages are considered inad-
equate, the respective national courts may develop means of treaty
circumvention, such as strict treaty interpretation, which would
reduce overall treaty effectiveness.
This problem has been encountered by air carriers attempting
to enforce the provisions of the Warsaw Convention in United
States courts. Two provisions in the Warsaw Convention "strip
the limitation of liability from an air carrier." 224 First, an air car-
rier is subject to unlimited liability if the carrier's "willful miscon-
duct" causes the damage, injury, or death.2 Second, unlimited
liability may exist if a passenger's ticket or claim check has not
been delivered or does not adequately explain the liability limiting
provisions of the Convention.226 United States courts have ex-
ploited this second provision through "judicial maneuverings and
innovative interpretations 227 to provide the basis for circum-
venting the Warsaw Convention's liability limitations. 22  The
222. "[A] treaty pre-empts, or takes precedence over any conflicting state or local
law." L. GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 216, at 4 (citing Boehringer-Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc.
v. Pan Am, 737 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1984) (Texas law permitting recovery of attorney's fees
gainst carriers for damaged cargo preempted by Warsaw Convention), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1186 (1985); Baker v. Landsell Protective Agency, Inc., 590 F Supp. 165 (S.D.N.Y
1984) (recovery against airport security employees for jewelry theft limited to maximum
liability set by Warsaw Convention)).
223. Maugme v. Compagme Nationale Air France, 549 F.2d 1256, 1258 n.2 (citing
Hussert v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 388 F Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y 1975)).
224. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 664 F Supp. 1463, 1471
(D.D.C. 1985).
225. Warsaw Convention, supra note 211, art. 25, 49 Stat. at 3020, T.S. No. 876, at
23, 137 L.N.T.S. at 27.
226. See id. arts. 3-4, at 3015-16, T.S. No. 876, at 17-18, 137 L.N.T.S. at 15, 17.
227. Korean Air Lines Disaster, 664 F Supp. at 1472.
228. See, e.g., Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.) (delivery of a
ticket to a passenger already on the plane does not meet Convention requirement that
notice of liability limits be given to passengers), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965); Lisl v.
Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, 253 F Supp. 237, 239 (S.D.N.Y 1966) ("[C]ompliance
with the Convention requires not mere physical delivery of a ticket and check before depar-
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broad range of possible interpretations by a variety of national
courts impedes progress toward the Convention's goal of a uni-
form international interpretation. 229 To prevent similar frustration
of future outer space liability treaties, national courts should be
directed to consider the "history and intent of the contracting sov-
ereigns 23° and reject the temptation to assist plaintiffs by creat-
ing loopholes that negate treaty effectiveness.
The second option for implementation of the proposed outer
space treaty would require the creation of an independent interna-
tional tribunal dealing exclusively with space-related accidents. In
practice, the outer space tribunal could be patterned after other
specialized international courts such as the European Court of
Human Rights, which was created "to ensure the observance" of
the European Convention on Human Rights.2"" Like the European
Court of Human Rights, the international outer space tribunal
would hear cases brought by a sovereign state as well as "an indi-
vidual, a group of individuals, or a nongovernmental organisa-
tion."2 32 The tribunal would resolve disputes in accordance with
proposed outer space treaty provisions, "international custom,"2 33
and "general principles of the law of civilized nations.9234
ture but delivery of a ticket and check which notify the passenger that the provisions of the
Convention which exclude or limit liability are applicable."), afld, 370 F.2d. 508 (2d Cir.),
afid, 390 U.S. 455 (1968). The Supreme Court has since rejected this maneuver. Chan v.
Korean Air Lines, 490 U.S. 1922 (1989).
229. Compare Korean Air Lines Disasters 664 F Supp. at 1476 (notification printed
in eight point type on passenger ticket is sufficient despite Montreal Agreement provision
that ten-point type be used) with List, 253 F Supp. at 243 ("Lilliputian typography" pro-
vides insufficient notice to passenger of carrier's limited liability).
230. Korean Air Lines Disaster, 664 F Supp. at 1471 (citing Choctaw Nation v.
United States, 318 U.S. 423 (1943)).
231. J. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (1988); see A. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 193-
236 (2d ed. 1977) (summarizing the history and operation of this court).
232. J. MERRILLS, supra note 231, at 2. This would contravene classic principles of
international law, which allow only sovereign states to appear as parties before interna-
tional tribunals. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 137, art. 34, 59
Stat. at 1059, T.S. No. 993, at 29. The classical rule reflects "the belief that the equality
and dignity of sovereign states would be compromised if states were sued by private par-
ties" H. STEINER & D. VAUTS, supra note 84, at 244.
233. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 137, art. 38(b), 59
Stat. at 1060, T.S. No. 993, at 30.
234. Id. art. 38(c), at 1060, T.S. No. 993, at 30. The European Court of Human
Rights decides cases according to several international agreements. See J. MERRILLS, supra
note 231, at 198. Therefore, as would be the case with the outer space tribunal, "[t]he
majority of references to general international law [will .concern] points of jurisdiction
or procedure." Id. at 184.
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Formation of an outer space tribunal would eliminate the risk
of biased treaty interpretation by national courts and thus protect
launchers from inequitable rulings that circumvent the treaty
damage limitation provisions. This would increase the predictabil-
ity of damage awards, enabling launchers to plan and structure
their enterprises more efficiently However, creation of this tribu-
nal might discourage injured third parties from pursuing valid
claims. The geographical location of the court alone might present
an insurmountable obstacle to many potential litigants because of
the travel expenses involved. This would be particularly true for
indigent victims, who are most in need of compensation. Further-
more, because the tribunal would adopt its own procedural rules,
litigating before it would be more complicated than simply pursu-
ing a claim before one's own national court. The added complexity
would increase the cost of bringing a claim. Therefore, it may be
best to proceed without the creation of the international tribunal.
In summary, the following statement concerning the Warsaw
Convention, made in 1934 by Secretary of State Cordell Hull,
aptly summarizes the advantages of an international agreement
specifying and limiting third party damages:
[T]he principle of limitation of liability will not only be benefi-
cial to passengers and shippers as affording a more definite basis
of recovery and as tending to lessen litigation, but it will
prove to be an aid in the development of international air trans-
portation, as such limitation will afford the carrier a more defi-
nite and equitable basis on which to obtain insurance rates, with
the probable result that there would eventually be a reduction of
operating expenses for the carrier and advantages to travelers
and shippers in the way of reduced transportation charges. 23 5
These same advantages would result from an outer space liability
treaty creating causes of action and damage limitations available
to injured third parties, regardless of the method of adjudication.
CONCLUSION
The federal government has assigned the responsibility of de-
veloping outer space through commercial space launches to pri-
vate enterprise. As a result, domestic corporations must now com-
235. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING A CONVENTION FOR THE UNIFICATION OF CERTAIN
RULES RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION BY AIR. S. EXEC. Doc. No. G, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1934).
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pete with launch agencies subsidized by foreign governments,
including Arianespace, which is the current international leader in
commercial space launches. The Commercial Space Launch Act
Amendments of 1988 greatly assist private industry in this en-
deavor. However, even this legislation acting in tandem with ex-
isting international treaties leaves the outcome of litigation, espe-
cially concerning third party damages, troublingly uncertain.
Further steps should be taken by the federal government to
assist private industry For instance, federal statutory and com-
mon law regarding outer space should be developed to increase the
uniformity and predictability of litigation. The resulting legal re-
gime should include a strict liability standard for damage and in-
jury to third parties. Also, there should be a cap on damages in
order to further advance uniformity and predictability Finally,
the United States should seek a modified liability treaty among
spacefaring nations establishing on an international scale the same
basic provisions adopted domestically The combined domestic and
international efforts of the federal government would further re-
duce uncertainty and reserve the limited amount of insurance
available on the world market for compensation of economic loss.
It is important to realize that "[n] ot one dollar of losses has
[ever] been paid on a third party claim, despite hundreds of
launches" by the United States. 28 The proposals set forth in this
note, which favor the spacecraft launchers, will therefore probably
never have to be used in actual litigation. They will, however, se-
cure the availability of affordable insurance coverage for a
fledgling industry facing well-established, heavily subsidized for-
eign competitors. The special treatment proposed focuses solely on
getting private outer space enterprise off the ground.
VAN C. ERNEST
236. Liability Hearings, supra note 27, at I (statement of Senator Riegle).
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